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Assessing “Lessons Learned”
• Particularly in a time of tight defence budgets, it is 
beneficial to compare notes on national acquisition 
approaches and experiences.
• While new theories are welcome, it is less speculative to study 
concrete “lessons learned” from other defence forces.
• The UK has undertaken innovative programmes in recent 
years, some of which warrant attention and consideration 
by other defence forces.
• An overview of these UK approaches indicates the benefits 
of more research on international efforts to identify best 
practices in acquisition management. 
Four UK Issues and Programmes
• The benefits of capability management.
• UK decision to acquire C-17 transports.
• Identifying key national defence capabilities.
• UK Defence Industrial Strategy.
• Strengths and Weaknesses of Multinational 
Acquisition Projects.
• European defence cooperation.
• U.S.-led multinational military cooperation.
• Joint Strike Fighter.
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A tale of three aircraft……
Background - 1
• 1994 – UK announced it would replace its 50-strong 
C130K fleet which had been in service since 1967
• 2-Stages
• Purchase 25 C130Js – entered service 1998-2001
• Participate in the European Airbus A400M programme to 
replace the other 25 aircraft
• 1997 – Approval to participate in the A400M 
programme
• Timescales uncertain
• 2000- Decision to lease four C-17s as an interim 
measure whilst awaiting A400M
• 7-year, £769M lease
Background - 2
• 2004-2009 Ongoing delays to A400M programme.
• Still awaiting first flight due, primarily, to problems 
with FADEC (engine control system)
• Flight test programme still to be announced – first 
flight probably in 2010
• Programme cancellation still an option
• 2004 – UK decided to purchase leased C-17s plus 
a fifth aircraft
• 2007 – Purchase of sixth aircraft announced
• 2031 – Planned C-17 Out of Service Date
Costs
£1,249MTotal
£260MPurchase of two new aircraft 
(£130M each)
£220MPurchase of four leased aircraft 
(£55M each)
£769MLease of C17s for 7 years
Notes: 
•Depreciation on leased aircraft due to heavy usage by RAF – 26,816 
hours over 5-years against planned usage of 21,600 over 7-years
•France now investigating stop-gap acquisition of three C-17s due to 
A400M delays
•UK investigating further expansion of its C17 fleet and/or additional 
C130Js
C-17 Acquisition – Key Points
• Leasing not necessarily the cheapest acquisition option, 
but..
• Provides financial planning stability and smoothes out the 
budget over the lease period
• Mitigates the additional risks imposed by difficulties in the 
A400M programme
• Provides a try before you buy option
• C-17 proved well suited to UK requirement
• Subsequent purchase is very low risk
• Leasing best suited to proven technologies and predictable 
operating profile, e.g. also used for Royal Navy Offshore 
Patrol Vessel
• Depreciation charges and cost of capital not reflected in 
resource based accounts – good for the balance sheet 
(although accounting rules for UK MoD are now changing, 
reducing the financial attractiveness of leasing)
Strategic Mobility – Through Life 
Capability Management
• Single Capability Manager has responsibility for all 
Strategic Mobility capability through life:
• Includes C130J/K, C-17 and A400M
• Programme manages across all the Defence Lines of 
Development
• Chairs the Capability Management Group who have 
responsibility for delivering across the Defence Lines 
of Development so that the user can generate force 
elements for integration to provide Joint Capability 
Packages
• Capability Manager is best placed to judge the trade-














The enduring ability to generate a desired operational outcome or effect, and is relative to the threat, 






Defence Equipment and Support
• Responsible both for equipment procurement and 
through life support 
• Combines roles of old Defence Procurement Agency 
(DPA) and Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO)
• Responsible for Equipment and Logistics Defence 
Lines of Development
• Provides and manages the interface with industry –
commercially aware
• Provides the Programme Support Function to the 
Capability Manager
• Separate Project Teams for C130(Hercules), C-17 and 
A400M (note A400M is managed by OCCAR 
(Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation)
Decision making
• Capability Manager takes decisions (subject to normal 
approvals) with full awareness of:
• C-17 costs
• A400M delays and technical issues
• C130 maintenance and life issues
• Training and Personnel issues
• Air Base rationalisation programmes
• End user/Capability requirements
• Etc. etc.
• Decisions are made in the best interests of defence
• But this requires culture change, which is still happening
• Integrated view of acquiring capability which breaks down the 
traditional single-service stove pipes and vested interests
Defence Industrial Strategy
• DIS – Published in 
2005 under the clear 
leadership and 





• The strategy carefully considers:
• Which industrial capabilities we need to retain 
in the UK to ensure that we can continue to 
operate our equipment in the way we choose 
to maintain appropriate sovereignty and 
thereby protect our national security.  The 
Strategy sets these out, and explains clearly 
for the first time which industrial capabilities 
we require to be sustained onshore, noting 
that – as now – there are many that we can 
continue to seek to satisfy through open 
international competition.
(Foreword – DIS, 2005)
Key Points
• Outlines in a more transparent manner how 
defence decisions are made
• Assists UK industry in its future planning by 
seeking to be more open on future UK 
defence acquisition plans
• Emphasises need for change in relationship 
between MoD and Industry
• Highlights need for change in behaviours
Structure
• Section A – The Strategic Overview
• Assesses the factors that impact on UK national defence 
requirements
• Section B – Review by Industrial Sector and Cross–cutting 
Capabilities
• Determines areas where cooperation with non-UK firms carries 
an acceptable risk and benefit
• Recognises those areas where the UK cannot maintain a 
domestic industrial capability at an acceptable cost
• Highlights those areas where a UK domestic capability needs to 
be maintained, and how the MoD will partner with industry to 
achieve this
• Section C – Implementing the Defence Industrial Strategy
• Behaviours – Defence Values for Acquisition
• National Audit Office ‘Gold Standard’ for project and programme 
management
• Through Life and Integrated approach
• Innovation, Flexibility and Agility
• Professional Delivery Skills
Key Statements - Maritime
• “The future for UK shipbuilders lies in high value 
design, systems and sub-systems assembly and 
integration; plus specialist and novel hull 
construction capability, particularly where there is 
a high outfit to steel ratio, as exhibited in complex 
warships.”
• “Industry restructuring and consolidation is likely 
to be a key feature of any improvement 
programme, and fundamental to creating a viable 
and sustainable business to meet anticipated 
steady-state demand.”
Key Statements - Land
• “There are compelling advantages to retaining a UK 
industrial AFV capability ay a level which enables the 
UK to preserve the expertise it requires to maintain 
and upgrade the capability of current and future 
equipment, both in peacetime and for operational 
requirements.”
• “There is no absolute requirement to manufacture all 
of the constituent parts of an AFV in the UK.  An 
onshore capability to repair and overhaul AFVs is 
however required.”
• “The ability of industry to respond quickly at times of 
high operational tempo is of particular priority.  This 
includes the design and delivery of UORs (Urgent 
Operational Requirements) in a timely manner.”
Key Statements – Fixed Wing
• “Current plans do not envisage the UK needing to 
build a future generation of manned fast jet 
aircraft beyond these types (Typhoon and JSF -
F35 Lightning).”
• “The retention of an aerospace engineering and 
design capability is critical for through-life 
capability management, in order to provide for 
maintenance, major upgrade and integration of 
new weapon systems, avionics and defensive aids”
Implications
• There is no ‘buy British’ backdrop to the DIS
• There is a UK willingness to enter into 
multinational arrangement when the need is clear
• DIS led to the Defence Acquisition Change 
Programme
• Introduced Through Life Capability Management
• Merged the Defence Procurement Agency and 
defence Logistics Agency to form Defence Equipment 
and Support; reinforces the through life approach to 
acquiring equipment capability
• Instituted a change in culture across defence 
acquisition – decisions are taken on a capability 
basis outside of the traditional single-service 
stovepipes
Progress
• Industry rationalisation:  Good in some areas (Ship building and Ship 
Maintenance), slower in other areas (Land Systems).
• Partnering and Alliancing: Some successful initiatives, e.g. Team 
Complex Weapons including MBDA(UK), Thales UK, Roxel and 
Qinetiq, with the MoD
• Private Finance Initiatives – Future Support Tanker Aircraft, Military 
Flying Training System
• But overall progress slower than industry would have wished
• Still insufficient transparency about MoD plans.
• Concern about affordability of DIS as it stands
• Updated DIS, due to be published in Dec 2007 still awaited.  Seen by 
Industry as lack of MoD commitment.
• Resignation of Lord Drayson in 2008 – DIS now without a champion.
• TLCM progressing well but danger of over complex structures and 
processes.
• Through life thinking slowly becoming embedded.
• Joint approach starting to happen but Single Service stove-pipes still 
exist
Summary
• Defence Industrial Strategy – Innovative and 
Extensive
• Implementation slow, but probably better than 
might have been expected.
• Industry remains concerned about the MoD’s lack 
of commitment.
• Need to see whether future difficult decisions 
(FRES, A400M, Typhoon etc.) will be taken on 
political or DIS and TLCM grounds
European Defence Cooperation
UK Support -- When Europe 
Delivers
• UK support for European Defence Cooperation is 
a good example of creative approaches to defence 
acquisition.
• More generally, the UK supports participation in 
worthwhile multinational projects.
• Endorsed in the Defence Industrial Strategy.
• Backed up with acquisition decisions. 
• Driving factor: acquiring capabilities.
UK Practice
• Will proceed with European defence cooperative projects 
if they make sense.
• UK is the most active participant in European military 
procurement.
• Over 30% of UK total equipment procurement was conducted in 
a project with another EU state.
• In 2006, EDA reported 6.66 billion Euros spent by European 
states on multinational projects.  
– UK largest practitioner with 2.58 billion Euros.
• 6.07 billion Euros specifically spent on European projects.
– UK largest practitioner with 2.26 billion Euros.
• Major projects: working with France on the new aircraft 
carriers.
Problems With Euro-Projects
• However, the UK clearly recognizes the 
shortcomings of European defence efforts.
• The UK will not support Euro-projects when they 
do not produce capabilities.
• Type 45 destroyer program arose because two 
European attempts were not satisfactory: NFR-90 and 
Horizon CNGF.
• A400M transport purchase cut from 45 to 25.
– Cancellation is not out of the question.
Problems with Euro-Process
• There is no shortage of statements to promote European 
cooperation.
• European Defence Agency has an electronic Bulletin Board.
• EDA generated Intergovernmental Regime in Defence 
Procurement within Article 296 of EC Treaty.
• Associated Code of Conduct to promote transparency and equal 
treatment of suppliers
• Problem: National governments and industry are under no 
obligation to use the Bulletin Board or, more generally, 
follow mandates in documents.
• Example: Commitments from European countries about a 
European Air Transport Fleet.
• No new concrete steps to make that happen.
Preference -- The U.S.
• General UK sentiment: buy the last generation of U.S. 
equipment rather than the next generation of European 
capabilities.
• Probably prefer to have bought destroyers with Aegis rather 
than developing the Type 45.
• Key factors are strongly in favour of defence cooperation 
with the U.S. rather than Europe.
• U.S. military spending is particularly important.
• U.S. spends twice as much on defence as Europe combined.
• U.S. outspends Europe six to one in defence R&D
• U.S. targets 35% of defence spending on investment compared to 
20% in Europe.
• Security policy, history, etc. contribute to UK preference 
to work with the U.S. 
Problem -- The U.S.
• The U.S. occasionally takes decisions which 
generate questions in Europe about following the 
U.S. lead in military acquisition. 
• The 2008 decision to re-bid the aerial tanker 
contract under Congressional pressure was the 
most recent example.
• European perception: The Air Force process was 
“flawed” only because the decision was in favour of 
the Northrup-Grumman/EADS KC-30 tanker 
proposal. 
KC-30 -- EADS Efforts
• EADS recognized it would need a U.S. partner to be 
competitive for the contract.
• It worked to arrange the partnership with Northrup-
Grumman.
• They emphasized that the KC-30 would be an American 
tanker.
• They maximised U.S. content by having the Airbus A330 
airframe built in the U.S.
• In short, EADS incurred great costs to be a credible bidder 
for the aerial tanker contract.
• Depending on how the issue is finally resolved, European 
firms will be more reluctant to incur such costs if they do 
not believe they  have a reasonable chance of winning U.S. 
contracts.
European Reactions 
• The re-bidding of the contract casts doubt on the 
U.S. willingness to engage in an “objective”
competition.
• It validates the views of those who argue that 
even if European firms partner with U.S. defence 
firms, they will not be able to enter the U.S. 
market.
• Politically, it strengthens those who argue that the 
U.S. will also act to defend its own companies and 
preserve domestic military capabilities, so there is 
no reason for Europe to bow to U.S. criticism.
Key Problem -- Competition
• The KC-30 decision damages the goal of 
promoting competition in the defence sector.
• Can the U.S. generate sufficient competition only 
from American firms?
• It was Congress which initially criticized the fact that 
there was no competitor to Boeing on the tanker 
program.
• Does the U.S. anticipate European firms providing 
the competition in the future?
• If so, European firms need to believe that if they incur 
substantial costs, they have a reasonable chance of 
obtaining contracts.
Summary
• The UK is clearly in a different situation than the 
U.S., but one which is similar to all other friends 
and Allies. 
• The UK readiness to support European defence 
cooperation has been valuable.
• The key is whether European programs can 
efficiently provide capabilities.
• The benefits of European defence cooperation, 
and the general contribution European firms can 
bring to acquisition programs in the U.S. and 
elsewhere, are worthy of further analysis.
Joint Strike Fighter
Major UK Commitment
• Prime example of UK commitment to 
following innovative approaches to defence 
acquisition.
• UK was the only “Level 1” partner in the 
JSF design and development phase.
• It contributed $2 billion to that phase.
• In March 2009, it committed to purchase of 
three F-35B operational test aircraft.
UK Participation -- History
• In the mid-1990’s, the UK was looking for new Future 
Carrier Borne Aircraft for CVF programme.
• U.S. was working on next-generation strike aircraft.
• U.S. and UK combined efforts.
• Focus for UK was on Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing 
(STOVL) capabilities.
• In 2001, UK preference for JSF confirmed in MOU with 
the U.S.
• UK selected the STOVL variant in 2002.
• STOVL design completed in 2005.
• UK will purchase 138 fighters.
Key Policy Decision
• The UK made a critical decision in 
committing itself to the JSF.
• UK is already working with modelling and 
simulation for use of JSF on the new 
carriers.
• If there are problems with the JSF, and the 
STOVL version in particular, the UK faces a 
major problem.  
Other Key Factors For The UK
• UK wants to emphasize interoperability with the 
U.S.
• There is substantial industrial participation.
• BAE Systems is the largest non-U.S. participant in the 
JSF.  
• Estimate of some £14 billion in business.
• As a partner nation, the UK can receive revenue 
from additional JSF sales.
• CRS notes DOD estimate of $5-$40 of revenue for 
every $1 invested in JSF.
Problem -- Technology Transfer
• The source code issue would have been a 
problem under any circumstance.
• House of Commons Defence Committee noted 
that the UK could not accept a situation where it 
could not operate the JSF independently of the 
U.S.
• In 2006, the Committee called on the UK to develop 
a “Plan B” for alternative aircraft if the source code 
issue was not resolved satisfactorily.
• The Defence Industrial Strategy cites the 
overarching policy reasons that the UK needs to 
have access to such data, and notes the particular 
difficulties with the U.S.
House of Commons Defence 
Committee (2005)
“It is vital that the UK gets all the information and access to 
technology it requires from the U.S. to have ‘Sovereign 
Capability’ – the ability to maintain the Joint Strike Fighter 
aircraft and undertake future upgrades independently.  The 
UK must receive adequate assurances that it will get all the 
information and access to technology it requires before 
the programme is too far advanced.  If these assurances 
are not given, it is questionable whether the UK should 
continue its involvement in the programme.”
Defence Industrial Strategy (2005)
“To meet our own sovereign needs, it is important that we 
continue to have the autonomous capability to operate, 
support and where necessary adapt the equipment that we 
procure.  Appropriate technology transfer is therefore of 
crucial importance.  This is so for any cooperative project, 
but in practice difficulties have arisen particularly with the 
U.S., whose technology disclosure policy we have found 
less adapted to the needs of cooperative procurement 
than those of our partners in Europe.”
A Never-Ending Problem
• The issue never seemed to be resolved, which 
added to UK frustration.
• Bilateral defence technology agreement outlined in 
2002.
• Source code issue arose in 2004 at Ministerial 
level.
• UK thought it was resolved at President-PM level 
in May 2006.
• Not finally resolved until end of 2006.
No Reason For The Problem
• 99.8% of licenses for UK-U.S. transactions are approved.
• 8,500 items and $14 billion in value.
• UK-U.S. defence industrial interconnection has increased 
substantially.
• UK firms have acquired 50 U.S. aerospace and defence firms 
since 2001.
• 75% of all foreign investment in the U.S. defence sector.
• No instances of real problems with the UK where U.S. 
interests in JSF were damaged.
• The reports do not criticize UK firms, but DOD procedures.
Legacy Problem
• Now that this is resolved, JSF is a low-profile 
project.
• Defence Committee simply notes it is progressing 
well and will simply monitor developments.
• The problem is that the contentious history on 
this key tech transfer issue cannot be erased.
• This is how the U.S. dealt with its closest ally on a 
multinational project of singular importance.
• This was noted by other nations considering 
participation in U.S.-led projects.
Questions for U.S. Consideration
• With increasing development costs, does the U.S. 
need to make a greater effort to find partners 
who can help carry those costs?  
• Can the U.S. take greater consideration of the views 
of other possible partner nations?
• Can the tech transfer regime be modified to address 
the need to work with partners while continuing to 
protect sensitive information?
• Decisions on partners may have an impact on 
production and overseas sales.
• Can U.S. firms survive solely on DOD contracts?
Summary
• The UK clearly is inclined to participate in U.S.-led military 
acquisition programs.
• The JSF is merely the most high-profile example of this UK 
policy.
• However, the JSF also provided the most high-profile 
examples of the difficulties in participating in a U.S.-led 
project.
• The overriding issues that warrant more extensive 
research are
• The extent to which multinational projects may be needed in 
order to spread costs.
• The degree to which a multinational approach may be needed in 
order to ensure production runs and sales.
• The extent to which technology transfer processes can be 
modified so they do not hinder multinational projects. 
Conclusion
• Common UK acquisition themes
• Remain open to consideration of innovative 
approaches.
• Analyse best practices of other defence forces.
• Put the policy into practice.
• Particularly at this time, it is valuable to research 
and analyse “lessons learned” from national 
defence acquisition experiences.
